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The	  Multi-­‐Scale	  Dynamics	  of	  Executive	  Function	  	   A	  central	  problem	  in	  the	  study	  of	  developmental	  psychology	  concerns	  cognitive	  control.	  According	  to	  standard	  approaches	  to	  cognitive	  science,	  the	  cognitive	  system	  is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  number	  of	  subsystems;	  somehow,	  it	  must	  control	  and	  coordinate	  these	  subsystems	  in	  order	  to	  function.	  Imagine	  a	  task	  as	  simple	  as	  navigating	  oneself	  through	  the	  environment.	  According	  to	  the	  modal	  view	  of	  psychology,	  navigation	  requires	  a	  number	  of	  cognitive	  capabilities	  (Wolbers	  &	  Hegarty,	  2010).	  Among	  other	  things,	  navigation	  requires	  selectively	  attending	  to	  rapidly	  changing	  environmental	  information,	  storing	  and	  retrieving	  information	  from	  memory,	  and	  responding	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  environment	  by	  choosing	  the	  correct	  action	  from	  an	  array	  of	  possibilities.	  Even	  during	  something	  as	  simple	  as	  navigation,	  a	  variety	  of	  cognitive	  resources	  must	  be	  utilized	  and	  coordinated.	  	  	  	   	  This	  coordination	  during	  complex	  actions	  requires	  explanation.	  Classical	  theories	  of	  psychology	  traditionally	  solve	  this	  problem	  by	  positing	  a	  master	  subsystem	  called	  “executive	  function.”	  	  On	  this	  account,	  executive	  function	  has	  direct	  control	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  cognitive	  system.	  It	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  “monitoring	  and	  controlling	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  (Carlson,	  2005),”	  deploying	  cognitive	  resources	  in	  response	  to	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  circumstances	  of	  the	  cognitive	  system.	  
The	  Development	  of	  Executive	  Function	  Executive	  function	  goes	  through	  a	  series	  of	  developmental	  steps.	  Infants	  have	  very	  poorly	  developed	  executive	  function,	  and	  show	  very	  little	  ability	  to	  plan	  ahead	  and	  make	  premeditated	  decisions	  about	  things	  in	  their	  environments.	  For	  example,	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failure	  on	  the	  classic	  Piagetian	  A-­‐not-­‐B	  task	  has	  been	  described	  as	  reflecting	  immature	  executive	  function	  (Diamond,	  1998).	  The	  reason	  that	  the	  infant	  is	  unable	  to	  correctly	  identify	  the	  location	  of	  the	  desired	  object	  is	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  to	  inhibit	  a	  pre-­‐potent	  response,	  according	  to	  Diamond.	  The	  A-­‐not-­‐B	  task,	  Diamond	  (1985)	  said,	  “…sets	  up	  a	  competition	  between	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  short-­‐term	  recall	  to	  guide	  behavior	  and	  a	  conditioned	  behavioral	  tendency	  to	  repeat	  a	  rewarded	  response”	  (p.	  880).	  The	  rewarded	  response	  is	  the	  behavior	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  inhibited.	  As	  children	  grow	  older,	  their	  executive	  function	  improves.	  By	  12	  months	  of	  age	  children	  successfully	  pass	  the	  A-­‐not-­‐B	  task	  (Smith	  &	  Thelen,	  2003).	  However,	  more	  difficult	  executive	  function	  tasks,	  such	  as	  card	  sorting,	  still	  pose	  a	  challenge	  for	  children	  during	  the	  preschool	  years.	  	  Zelazo	  and	  his	  colleagues	  (Zelazo	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Muller	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Zelazo,	  2006)	  have	  shown	  that,	  under	  many	  circumstances,	  children	  at	  3	  years	  of	  age	  have	  trouble	  switching	  rules	  during	  card	  sorting,	  even	  when	  the	  rule	  is	  given	  explicitly.	  According	  to	  the	  standard	  account,	  the	  successful	  execution	  of	  card	  sorting	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  subsystems,	  including	  storage	  of	  feedback	  and	  perceptual	  information	  in	  memory,	  the	  use	  of	  deductive	  reasoning	  to	  determine	  which	  of	  several	  rules	  is	  the	  correct	  one,	  and	  making	  and	  executing	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  when	  a	  rule	  is	  chosen.	  Because	  card	  sorting	  requires	  the	  use	  and	  coordination	  of	  cognitive	  subsystems,	  it	  provides	  a	  sensitive	  index	  of	  executive	  function	  (Zelazo	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  By	  5	  years	  of	  age,	  most	  children	  smoothly	  change	  rules	  when	  told	  to	  do	  so	  	  (Zelazo,	  2006).	  The	  development	  of	  executive	  function	  continues	  into	  adulthood	  (Zelazo,	  Carlson,	  &	  Kesek,	  2008;	  Zelazo,	  Craik,	  &	  Booth,	  2004).	  Other	  card-­‐sorting	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tasks,	  such	  as	  the	  Wisconsin	  Card	  Sort,	  are	  designed	  to	  evaluate	  the	  executive	  function	  capabilities	  of	  older	  children	  and	  adults	  (Grant	  &	  Berg,	  1948).	  As	  these	  examples	  illustrate,	  executive	  function	  appears	  to	  have	  a	  protracted	  developmental	  course.	  These	  developmental	  changes	  allow	  children	  to	  perform	  tasks	  requiring	  increasingly	  complex	  cognitive	  coordination.	  	  
The	  Modal	  Theory	  of	  Executive	  Function	  The	  dominant	  approach	  to	  executive	  function	  is	  to	  define	  it	  as	  a	  top	  down,	  higher-­‐order	  process	  (Carlson,	  2003).	  On	  this	  account,	  executive	  function	  exerts	  direct	  control	  over	  the	  system.	  Executive	  function	  takes	  information	  about	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  cognitive	  system,	  and	  changes	  the	  system	  in	  response	  to	  those	  new	  circumstances.	  This	  explanation	  and,	  indeed	  the	  term	  “executive	  function,”	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  a	  controlling	  entity	  in	  the	  system,	  governing	  its	  goal-­‐directed	  behavior.	  Described	  this	  way,	  executive	  function	  is	  treated	  implicitly	  (and	  sometimes	  explicitly	  –	  see	  Baddeley,	  1996)	  as	  a	  homunculus	  in	  the	  mind.	  However,	  endowing	  the	  system	  with	  a	  central	  planner	  carries	  some	  very	  difficult	  theoretical	  problems	  (Anastas,	  Stephen	  &	  Dixon,	  2011).	  For	  example,	  one	  must	  explain	  where	  the	  central	  planner’s	  ability	  to	  plan	  comes	  from.	  The	  executive	  must	  have	  its	  own	  executive	  to	  make	  plans,	  which	  in	  turn	  must	  have	  its	  own	  executive,	  and	  so	  on.	  Obviously,	  this	  creates	  an	  infinite	  regress;	  by	  invoking	  an	  executive	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  cognition,	  one	  merely	  pushes	  the	  explanation	  for	  control	  of	  action	  back	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  into	  a	  construct	  that	  must	  then	  have	  its	  own	  workings	  explained.	  Much	  of	  the	  work	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relating	  to	  executive	  control	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  the	  homunculus	  as	  an	  explanation	  (Yeung,	  2010).	  	  A	  second,	  less	  obvious	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  executive	  must	  have	  more	  information	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  system	  and	  the	  environment	  than	  the	  system	  itself	  does.	  The	  gathering	  and	  interpretation	  of	  information	  about	  the	  environment,	  the	  system,	  and	  their	  relationship,	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  being	  solved	  by	  taking	  explanatory	  power	  away	  from	  the	  system	  itself	  and	  assigning	  it	  to	  a	  central	  executive.	  The	  central	  executive,	  therefore,	  must	  know	  more	  about	  these	  things	  than	  the	  system	  itself	  does;	  otherwise,	  the	  central	  executive	  would	  not	  be	  necessary.	  Unfortunately,	  one	  problem	  has	  been	  exchanged	  for	  another.	  How	  can	  the	  executive	  possess	  more	  information	  than	  the	  system	  itself?	  
The	  Problem	  of	  Mind/Body	  Dualism	  	   More	  broadly,	  ascribing	  executive	  control	  to	  a	  central	  executive	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  committing	  to	  a	  physical/mental	  property	  dualistic	  perspective.	  Under	  this	  perspective,	  the	  world	  is	  divided	  into	  those	  objects	  that	  have	  physical	  properties,	  and	  those	  that	  have	  nonphysical	  properties.	  A	  dualistic	  approach	  to	  cognition	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  brain	  and	  mind	  are	  separated	  entities,	  related	  but	  independent.	  Under	  this	  division,	  the	  brain	  is	  physical,	  while	  the	  mind	  is	  nonphysical	  in	  nature.	  Physical	  information	  is	  transformed	  by	  some	  unknown	  means	  into	  nonphysical	  objects.	  Cognition	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  mind	  manipulates	  these	  representations	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  thought	  and	  action.	  	   Because	  the	  mind	  is	  nonphysical,	  however,	  physical	  law	  cannot	  explain	  its	  workings;	  the	  minds’	  interactions	  with	  the	  world	  require	  an	  alternative	  explanation.	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The	  mind	  must	  take	  action	  based	  on	  information	  about	  the	  world.	  The	  interpretation	  of	  that	  information	  provides	  the	  motivation	  to	  change	  itself,	  and	  enact	  change	  upon	  the	  world.	  	  Dualism,	  therefore,	  invites	  an	  executive	  entity	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  knowing	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  when.	  The	  central	  executive	  is	  a	  natural	  consequence	  of	  the	  move	  to	  build	  a	  theory	  of	  cognition	  around	  a	  premise	  of	  property	  dualism.	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  cognition	  independently	  of	  a	  central	  executive,	  with	  all	  of	  the	  logical	  problems	  inherent	  to	  that	  approach,	  we	  must	  formulate	  a	  new	  theory	  of	  cognition,	  in	  which	  we	  replace	  the	  premise	  of	  dualism	  with	  one	  of	  physicalism.	  	   The	  mind/body	  dualism	  approach	  to	  cognition	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  psychology.	  Early	  theorists	  in	  the	  field,	  following	  the	  example	  of	  centuries	  of	  philosophy	  (Descartes,	  1901),	  posited	  that	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  body	  had	  to	  be	  separate	  entities	  (Marvin,	  1915).	  Under	  this	  conception,	  the	  body	  is	  physical	  and	  material.	  The	  body	  is	  inert,	  and	  cannot	  initiate	  action	  on	  its	  own.	  	  It	  occupies	  space	  in	  the	  world,	  interacting	  with	  other	  physical	  things.	  Conversely,	  the	  mind	  is	  nonphysical.	  It	  does	  not	  occupy	  physical	  space,	  and	  is	  active,	  driving	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  physical	  body.	  While	  the	  body	  cannot	  move	  itself	  or	  initiate	  action,	  the	  mind	  can.	  The	  mind	  and	  the	  body	  interact	  together	  to	  allow	  the	  organism	  to	  function	  (Roelofs,	  1955).	  	   The	  problems	  with	  this	  approach	  are	  myriad.	  By	  adopting	  this	  stance,	  one	  must	  explain	  the	  process	  by	  which	  physical	  stimuli	  are	  transformed	  into	  non-­‐physical	  representations.	  Representations	  are	  non-­‐physical	  things;	  the	  stimuli	  one	  experiences	  in	  the	  world	  are	  physical.	  A	  dualistic	  approach	  must	  define	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  physical	  become	  the	  nonphysical.	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   Other	  problems	  abound.	  How	  are	  representations,	  which	  are	  non-­‐physical	  objects,	  manipulated	  by	  the	  mind?	  How	  do	  representations	  affect	  and	  change	  the	  physical	  world?	  Adopting	  a	  dualistic	  approach	  necessarily	  means	  adopting	  these	  philosophical	  problems	  along	  with	  it.	  	  
A	  Physicalist	  Theory	  of	  Executive	  Function	  	   One	  can	  avoid	  the	  problems	  of	  dualism	  by	  grounding	  cognition	  in	  physical,	  biological	  processes;	  this	  is	  the	  perspective	  known	  as	  physicalism.	  This	  alternate	  theoretical	  perspective	  proposes	  that	  cognition	  is	  the	  result	  of	  multi-­‐scale	  interactions	  endogenous	  to	  the	  system.	  On	  this	  account,	  cognitive	  structure	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  interactions	  of	  physical	  system	  activity,	  across	  many	  different	  timescales.	  Physical	  activity	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  cognitive	  structure.	  	  	   By	  grounding	  cognition	  in	  the	  physical,	  one	  avoids	  the	  myriad	  problems	  with	  dualism.	  Cognition	  no	  longer	  requires	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  way	  that	  physical	  information	  becomes	  representations.	  Instead,	  the	  biological	  processes	  of	  the	  living	  system	  are	  what	  give	  rise	  to	  cognition.	  Local	  gradients	  of	  energy	  and	  matter	  interact	  across	  many	  different	  time	  scales	  of	  the	  physical	  system.	  The	  interactions	  of	  these	  gradients	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  cognitive	  structure.	  We	  avoid	  the	  problems	  of	  dualism,	  then,	  by	  grounding	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  cognitive	  structure	  in	  physical,	  biological	  processes.	  	   Traditionally,	  psychology	  holds	  that	  the	  physical	  and	  the	  cognitive	  are	  at	  least	  partially	  separated.	  This	  dichotomy,	  however,	  is	  illusory,	  and	  largely	  driven	  by	  issues	  of	  measurement.	  Because	  we	  measure	  cognitive	  activity	  and	  physical	  activity	  in	  different	  ways,	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  describe	  them	  as	  two	  separate	  things	  that	  are	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at	  least	  semi-­‐independent.	  We	  propose	  that	  the	  cognitive	  and	  physical	  are	  inextricably	  linked;	  with	  the	  proper	  tools,	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  use	  the	  measurements	  of	  one	  to	  inform	  about	  change	  in	  the	  other.	  	   Figure	  1	  is	  an	  image	  of	  the	  Small	  Magellanic	  Cloud,	  captured	  by	  NASA	  using	  the	  Spitzer	  space	  telescope.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  look	  for	  the	  cloud	  at	  night	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  magnification	  device,	  one	  would	  see	  something	  like	  the	  leftmost	  part	  of	  the	  image	  of	  a	  colorful	  cloud	  in	  the	  night	  sky.	  One	  might	  falsely	  conclude	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  picture	  of	  interest,	  and	  that	  it	  contains	  all	  of	  the	  information	  one	  might	  need	  to	  make	  inferences	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  cloud.	  	   This	  conclusion,	  however,	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  coarse-­‐grained	  nature	  of	  the	  measurement	  taken	  using	  only	  the	  human	  eye.	  When	  magnified,	  one	  sees	  that	  the	  cloud	  is	  made	  of	  many	  parts,	  at	  finer	  scales	  of	  measurement.	  Magnification	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that	  the	  cloud	  contains	  planetary	  nebulae,	  which	  can	  also	  be	  magnified,	  revealing	  molecules	  of	  carbon,	  represented	  by	  the	  rightmost	  picture.	  The	  nebulae	  are	  made	  up	  partially	  of	  carbon	  (Kwok,	  2005),	  while	  the	  cloud	  consists	  partially	  of	  planetary	  nebulae.	  The	  smallest	  scale	  is	  nested	  within	  the	  middle	  scale,	  which	  is	  itself	  nested	  within	  the	  largest	  scale;	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  smaller	  scales	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  we	  see	  at	  the	  larger	  one.	  	   Cognition	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Behavioral	  data	  is	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  coarsest,	  longest	  timescale,	  the	  easiest	  thing	  for	  us	  to	  observe.	  An	  important	  mistake	  that	  much	  of	  experimental	  psychology	  makes	  is	  asserting	  that	  this	  scale	  of	  measurement	  contains	  most	  or	  all	  of	  the	  information	  one	  needs	  to	  make	  conclusions	  about	  psychology.	  We	  propose	  that,	  like	  the	  Small	  Magellanic	  Cloud,	  the	  structure	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that	  we	  observe	  at	  the	  coarse,	  behavioral	  scale	  is	  driven	  by	  activity	  at	  finer	  scales.	  Coarse,	  behavioral	  measurements	  are	  only	  telling	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  	   This	  leads	  to	  a	  very	  important	  question.	  We	  have	  devised	  many	  ways	  to	  measure	  phenomena	  at	  the	  behavioral	  level.	  How	  can	  we	  measure	  activity	  at	  finer	  scales	  of	  magnification?	  Our	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  underlying	  assertion	  that	  cognition	  is	  a	  physical	  process.	  Physical	  processes	  require	  the	  consumption	  of	  energy.	  As	  energy	  consumption	  increases,	  local	  gradients	  of	  energy	  and	  matter	  change.	  Changes	  in	  gradients	  cause	  changes	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  diffusion.	  Therefore,	  change	  in	  diffusion	  rates	  in	  a	  physical	  system	  should	  provide	  an	  indirect	  measure	  of	  multi-­‐scale	  activity.	  	  	   Prior	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  diffusion	  of	  physical	  activity	  predict	  success	  in	  cognitive	  tasks.	  For	  example,	  Stephen	  and	  Anastas	  (2011)	  found	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  diffusion	  of	  eye	  movements	  were	  linked	  with	  greater	  levels	  of	  success	  during	  a	  visual	  search	  task.	  The	  rate	  of	  diffusion	  of	  eye	  motions	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  predict	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  strategies	  during	  gear	  tracing	  tasks	  (Stephen	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Diffusion	  patterns	  have	  been	  found	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  cognitive	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  word	  naming	  (Holden	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  lexical	  decision-­‐making	  (Gilden,	  1997).	  	  	  	   Measurements	  of	  behavior	  can	  be	  used	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  changes	  in	  diffusion	  rates.	  Fine-­‐grained	  body	  movements	  (Hand	  motions,	  eye	  movements,	  and	  others)	  contain	  information	  about	  diffusion	  rates	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  calculate	  estimates	  of	  system	  activity.	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   In	  order	  to	  determine	  how	  interactions	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  cognitive	  structure,	  we	  motion	  tracked	  participants	  during	  an	  executive	  function	  task,	  card	  sorting,	  in	  order	  to	  calculate	  estimates	  of	  system	  activity	  across	  multiple	  time	  scales.	  Using	  analytical	  techniques	  adapted	  from	  econometrics,	  we	  examined	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  multiple	  scales	  of	  the	  physical	  system	  interacted	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  cognitive	  structure	  in	  response	  to	  the	  task.	  	   In	  the	  first	  experiment,	  college-­‐aged	  participants	  were	  motion	  tracked	  while	  sorting	  cards.	  Participants	  were	  either	  given	  the	  rule	  by	  which	  to	  sort,	  or	  were	  asked	  to	  induce	  the	  rule	  based	  on	  experimenter	  feedback.	  We	  predict	  that	  the	  multi-­‐scale	  interactions	  driving	  change	  will	  be	  different	  between	  the	  two	  conditions.	  Participants	  who	  are	  told	  which	  rule	  to	  use	  will	  exhibit	  a	  greater	  effect	  of	  longer,	  coarser	  time	  scales	  on	  all	  other	  time	  scales.	  Those	  who	  must	  induce	  the	  rule	  will	  exhibit	  a	  greater	  effect	  of	  the	  shorter,	  finer	  time	  scales	  on	  all	  other	  scales,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  system	  activity	  across	  all	  scales	  when	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  is	  perturbed.	  	   In	  the	  second	  experiment,	  we	  asked	  preschool-­‐aged	  participants	  to	  complete	  the	  same	  type	  of	  sorting	  task.	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  task,	  the	  rule	  by	  which	  the	  cards	  were	  sorted	  was	  changed	  without	  the	  participants’	  knowledge.	  When	  presented	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  task,	  preschool-­‐aged	  participants	  typically	  fail	  to	  switch	  to	  the	  new	  rule,	  a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  perseveration.	  We	  compared	  motion	  data	  gathered	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  rule	  switch,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  perseveration	  of	  the	  rule	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  multi-­‐scale	  activity	  of	  the	  system.	  We	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predict	  that	  perseveraters	  will	  show	  different	  multi-­‐scale	  effects	  than	  non-­‐perseveraters.	   Experiment	  1	  Method	  
Participants	  
	   Twenty-­‐six	  University	  of	  Connecticut	  undergraduate	  and	  graduate	  students	  participated.	  All	  participants	  gave	  consent	  in	  accordance	  with	  University	  of	  Connecticut	  informed	  consent	  procedures.	  Undergraduate	  participants	  received	  credit	  toward	  course	  completion;	  graduate	  students	  were	  not	  compensated	  for	  participation.	  
Materials	  
	   Participants	  sorted	  cards	  from	  a	  specially	  prepared	  deck.	  On	  each	  card	  in	  the	  deck	  was	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  brightly	  colored	  animal	  wearing	  a	  piece	  of	  clothing.	  These	  three	  characteristics	  (Animal,	  color,	  and	  clothing	  item)	  corresponded	  to	  the	  three	  potential	  sorting	  dimensions.	  Each	  sorting	  dimension	  contained	  four	  levels:	  for	  color,	  the	  four	  levels	  were	  red,	  green,	  blue,	  and	  yellow.	  For	  animal,	  the	  four	  levels	  were	  cow,	  pig,	  lion,	  and	  wolf.	  Finally,	  for	  clothing	  item,	  the	  four	  levels	  were	  glasses,	  hat,	  bowtie,	  and	  earrings.	  Each	  card	  contained	  one	  level	  from	  each	  dimension;	  for	  example,	  one	  card	  had	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  red	  wolf	  wearing	  a	  hat,	  which	  represents	  one	  level	  from	  each	  of	  the	  three	  dimensions.	  There	  was	  one	  card	  for	  each	  unique	  combination	  of	  the	  possible	  levels,	  making	  for	  a	  deck	  with	  64	  cards.	  Decks	  were	  randomly	  shuffled	  between	  runs.	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   Each	  participant’s	  sorting	  hand	  motions	  were	  tracked	  for	  each	  run.	  Motion	  tracking	  data	  was	  collected	  during	  sorting	  using	  a	  magnetic	  motion-­‐capture	  device	  (Polhemus	  Fastrak,	  Polhemus	  Corporation,	  Colchester,	  VT	  and	  6–D	  Research	  System	  software,	  Skill	  Technologies,	  Inc.,	  Phoenix,	  AZ).	  The	  position	  of	  the	  participant’s	  hand	  was	  sampled	  at	  60	  Hz.	  
Procedure	  Participants	  were	  required	  to	  take	  cards	  from	  a	  facedown	  deck	  and	  place	  them	  into	  one	  of	  four	  piles,	  based	  on	  one	  of	  the	  three	  previously	  described	  dimensions.	  Each	  pile	  contained	  a	  guide	  card,	  with	  each	  level	  of	  each	  rule	  represented	  once	  across	  the	  four	  guide	  cards.	  For	  example,	  one	  guide	  card	  contained	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  green	  lion	  wearing	  glasses.	  This	  was	  the	  only	  guide	  card	  to	  contain	  these	  three	  characteristics;	  participants	  would	  then	  place	  into	  this	  pile	  green	  cards,	  glasses	  cards,	  or	  lion	  cards,	  depending	  on	  which	  rule	  was	  active	  (See	  Figure	  2).	  After	  each	  card	  placement,	  the	  experimenter	  told	  the	  participant	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  card	  was	  correctly	  placed,	  according	  to	  whatever	  rule	  was	  active	  during	  that	  run.	  Each	  run	  had	  one	  unchanging	  rule.	  Participants	  were	  divided	  evenly	  between	  two	  conditions.	  In	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  participants	  were	  told	  which	  rule	  to	  use	  in	  sorting	  prior	  to	  beginning	  the	  run.	  In	  the	  induction	  condition,	  participants	  were	  never	  informed	  of	  the	  rule;	  instead,	  participants	  were	  required	  to	  induce	  the	  correct	  rule	  for	  each	  run	  using	  experimenter	  feedback.	  Participants	  sorted	  cards	  into	  piles	  until	  they	  correctly	  placed	  ten	  cards	  in	  succession.	  Each	  participant	  completed	  five	  runs.	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Analysis	  
Multifractal	  Detrended	  Fluctuation	  Analysis.	  	  For	  each	  run,	  we	  created	  a	  time	  series	  of	  inter-­‐point	  distances	  that	  was	  submitted	  to	  multifractal	  detrended	  fluctuation	  analysis	  (Kantelhardt	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Multifractal	  detrended	  fluctuation	  analysis	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  standard	  detrended	  fluctuation	  analysis	  (Peng,	  Havlin	  &	  Stanley,	  1995),	  which	  assesses	  long-­‐range	  correlations	  in	  non-­‐stationary	  time	  series	  x(t)	  of	  length	  N.	  First,	  the	  time	  series	  is	  integrated	  to	  produce	  a	  trajectory	  y(t):	  
Equation	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
where
! 
x(i) 	  is	  the	  ith	  interpoint	  distance	  and	  
! 
x(t) 	  is	  the	  average	  interpoint	  distance.	  Next,	  the	  integrated	  time	  series	  is	  segmented	  into	  non-­‐overlapping	  bins	  of	  length	  n,	  such	  that	   .	  DFA	  proceeds	  with	  a	  least-­‐squares	  regression	  within	  each	  bin.	  The	  residuals	  of	  these	  regressions	  provide	  an	  estimate	  of	  root	  mean	  square	  (RMS)	  error:	  Equation	  2	  
,	  where	  
! 
yn(t) 	  is	  the	  y	  coordinate	  of	  local	  trend	  within	  each	  bin.	  DFA	  treats	  the	  average	  RMS	  error	  as	  the	  fluctuation	  F(n)	  for	  bin	  size	  n.	  The	  relationship	  between	  F(n)	  and	  n	  is	  the	  fluctuation	  function	  increasing	  as:	  Equation	  3	   	  
! 





4 " n " N /4
! 
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When	  the	  fluctuation	  function	  is	  plotted	  on	  double-­‐logarithmic	  axes,	  the	  relationship	  between	  log	  F(n)	  and	  log	  n	  may	  be	  linear.	  The	  slope	  of	  this	  linear	  relationship	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  Hurst	  exponent.	  	   DFA	  is	  occasionally	  susceptible	  to	  sinusoidal	  trends	  in	  time	  series	  data.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  Hurst	  exponent	  produced	  by	  DFA	  is	  affected	  by	  low	  frequency	  trends,	  producing	  an	  inaccurate	  estimate	  of	  activity	  (Hu	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  To	  protect	  against	  this,	  each	  time	  series	  was	  filtered	  prior	  to	  analysis.	  High	  power,	  low	  frequency	  motions	  were	  removed	  on	  a	  run-­‐by-­‐run	  basis,	  trimming	  the	  adverse	  effect	  of	  outliers	  in	  amplitude	  from	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  Hurst	  exponent,	  as	  described	  by	  Chianca	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  	   Standard	  DFA	  assumes	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  system	  activity	  across	  all	  scales	  of	  interest	  in	  a	  system.	  Multifractal	  Detrended	  fluctuation	  analysis	  (MF-­‐DFA)	  allows	  for	  differences	  in	  activity	  at	  different	  scales	  of	  measurement	  (Kantelhardt	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  MF-­‐DFA	  accomplishes	  this	  by	  nonlinearly	  transforming	  the	  collected	  residuals	  in	  each	  bin	  by	  a	  factor	  Q:	  Equation	  4	  
FQ (s) ! {
1
2Ns
[F 2 (v, s)]Q/2
v=1
2Ns
"# }1/Q 	  
	   We	  then	  proceed	  through	  the	  standard	  DFA	  procedure	  using	  the	  new	  residuals.	  This	  transformation	  allows	  emphasis	  of	  different	  scales	  of	  activity;	  higher	  values	  of	  Q	  minimize	  the	  effect	  of	  smaller	  scales,	  and	  emphasize	  the	  effect	  of	  larger	  scales.	  Lower	  values	  of	  Q	  achieve	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  For	  each	  gathered	  time	  series,	  we	  generated	  a	  Hurst	  exponent	  for	  Q	  values	  ranging	  from	  -­‐4	  to	  positive	  4	  at	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intervals	  of	  .5.	  This	  array	  of	  Hurst	  exponents	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  system	  activity	  at	  time	  scales	  ranging	  from	  the	  very	  low	  to	  the	  very	  high.	  	   We	  used	  an	  epoching	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  track	  changes	  in	  the	  Hurst	  exponent	  over	  time	  (Weber	  et	  al,	  2005).	  Epoching	  is	  a	  useful	  method	  for	  examining	  a	  non-­‐stationary	  time	  series.	  In	  the	  epoch	  approach	  a	  sliding	  window	  is	  moved	  across	  the	  time	  series;	  each	  window	  is	  an	  epoch.	  MF-­‐DFA	  is	  performed	  for	  each	  epoch.	  Each	  window	  was	  800	  samples	  wide,	  and	  was	  shifted	  by	  600	  cycles	  for	  each	  step,	  leaving	  an	  overlap	  of	  200	  samples	  per	  step.	  Approaching	  the	  data	  this	  way	  allows	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  Hurst	  exponent	  is	  changing	  over	  time.	  	   Estimates	  of	  system	  activity	  obtained	  by	  applying	  MF-­‐DFA	  were	  used	  in	  vector	  autoregression	  analysis,	  an	  analytical	  technique	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  components	  of	  complex	  system	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  A	  more	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  vector	  autoregression	  analysis	  is	  presented	  below,	  in	  the	  results	  section.	   Results	  Participants	  committed	  few	  to	  no	  sorting	  errors	  during	  each	  run,	  regardless	  of	  condition.	  Participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition	  took	  less	  time	  on	  average	  to	  complete	  a	  run	  (M	  =	  55.85	  seconds,	  SD	  =	  19.5)	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  induction	  condition	  (M	  =	  73.25,	  SD	  =	  27.15).	  	  We	  used	  growth	  curve	  modeling	  (GCM)	  to	  test	  whether	  or	  not	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  task	  decreased	  as	  the	  participant	  completed	  more	  runs.	  We	  found	  that	  adding	  trial	  as	  a	  predictor	  increased	  model	  fit	  significantly	  when	  compared	  to	  a	  model	  with	  only	  a	  model	  intercept	  (χ2(1)	  =	  493.83,	  p	  <	  .0001).	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Time	  taken	  to	  finish	  a	  run	  decreased	  significantly	  as	  trial	  increased;	  refer	  to	  table	  1	  for	  model	  coefficients.	  	   We	  also	  used	  GCM	  to	  test	  whether	  or	  not	  time	  to	  completion	  was	  the	  same	  between	  the	  two	  conditions.	  We	  added	  condition	  as	  a	  predictor	  to	  the	  prior	  model,	  which	  significantly	  improved	  model	  fit	  (χ2(1)	  =	  10.525,	  p	  <	  .01).	  Trial	  was	  a	  significant	  predictor,	  such	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  induction	  condition	  took	  significantly	  longer	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition;	  logically,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  inducing	  the	  rule	  would	  increase	  the	  time	  necessary	  for	  completion.	  	  See	  table	  2	  for	  model	  coefficients.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  testing	  condition	  as	  a	  time	  invariant	  factor	  in	  trial	  length,	  we	  tested	  whether	  or	  not	  condition	  interacted	  with	  trial	  to	  change	  the	  rate	  of	  completion	  over	  time.	  The	  interaction	  between	  trial	  and	  condition,	  however,	  was	  non-­‐significant.	  	  	   The	  motion	  tracker	  measured	  the	  3-­‐D	  position	  of	  the	  hand	  60	  times	  each	  second.	  From	  those	  3-­‐D	  measurements,	  we	  created	  a	  time	  series	  of	  displacements	  for	  each	  run	  separately	  by	  calculating	  Euclidean	  distances	  between	  adjacent	  measurements.	  	  Figure	  3	  shows	  a	  sample	  displacement	  time	  series.	  	   We	  applied	  MF-­‐DFA	  to	  each	  of	  the	  displacement	  time	  series.	  As	  stated	  above,	  MF-­‐DFA	  non-­‐linearly	  transforms	  the	  binned	  residuals	  of	  each	  time	  series	  in	  order	  to	  emphasize	  different	  scales	  of	  activity	  (Kantelhardt	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  Figure	  4	  shows	  the	  Hurst	  exponents	  from	  one	  participant	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  Q,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  one	  run.	  Each	  colored	  line	  represents	  a	  level	  of	  Q.	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   In	  a	  standard	  error	  correction	  model,	  system	  activity	  D	  for	  a	  time	  scale	  Q	  at	  time	  t	  is	  a	  product	  of	  two	  main	  predictors.	  The	  first,	  represented	  in	  equation	  5	  by	  each	  of	  the	  values	  of	  φ,	  represents	  adjustments	  based	  on	  system	  activity	  at	  time	  t-­‐1	  for	  all	  time	  scales.	  System	  activity	  at	  any	  given	  time	  scale	  is	  partially	  the	  product	  of	  system	  activity	  at	  all	  time	  scales	  at	  the	  previous	  time	  step.	  	  	   The	  second,	  represented	  in	  equation	  5	  by	  each	  of	  the	  values	  of	  ρ,	  are	  the	  cointegration	  relations	  between	  levels	  of	  the	  system.	  In	  a	  complex	  system,	  the	  various	  components	  of	  the	  system	  work	  together	  to	  produce	  equilibrium	  over	  time.	  	  Cointegration	  entails	  that	  when	  one	  of	  the	  components	  of	  the	  system	  is	  perturbed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  disturb	  this	  equilibrium,	  the	  other	  scales	  of	  the	  system	  will	  work	  to	  correct	  it	  such	  that	  equilibrium	  is	  restored.	  When	  the	  number	  of	  variables	  in	  the	  system,	  k,	  is	  greater	  than	  2,	  the	  number	  of	  cointegration	  relations	  can	  range	  from	  0	  to	  k-­‐1.	  	   Imagine	  a	  simple	  system,	  where	  two	  people	  work	  together	  to	  carry	  a	  box	  full	  of	  weights.	  Each	  person	  must	  apply	  force	  in	  order	  to	  move	  the	  box.	  The	  movement	  of	  the	  people	  holding	  the	  box	  should	  be	  cointegrated,	  such	  that	  a	  perturbation	  to	  one	  will	  require	  the	  other	  to	  correct	  for	  it.	  If,	  for	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  lifters	  begins	  to	  slacken,	  the	  other	  lifter	  must	  increase	  the	  amount	  of	  force	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  box	  off	  of	  the	  ground.	  The	  two	  holders	  are	  endogenous	  variables	  in	  the	  system;	  each	  one	  affects,	  and	  is	  affected	  by,	  the	  other.	  The	  two	  holders	  must	  work	  together	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  equilibrium,	  where	  the	  box	  is	  kept	  off	  of	  the	  ground.	  Conversely,	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  box	  is	  an	  exogenous	  variable	  in	  the	  system.	  Regardless	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of	  how	  much	  force	  the	  two	  holders	  applies,	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  box	  will	  never	  change.	  The	  weight	  of	  the	  box	  affects	  the	  system,	  but	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  it.	  	   The	  two	  brackets	  on	  the	  right	  in	  equation	  5	  represent	  this	  trend	  towards	  equilibrium.	  The	  error-­‐correction	  term,	  represented	  as	  a	  linear	  relationship	  amongst	  the	  scales	  of	  the	  system,	  works	  to	  correct	  system	  activity	  at	  each	  individual	  level	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  system.	  The	  cointegration	  relations,	  represented	  by	  ρ,	  weight	  these	  corrections	  based	  on	  the	  relationship	  amongst	  scales	  in	  the	  system.	  	   Once	  we	  have	  estimated	  a	  model	  that	  integrates	  these	  factors,	  we	  can	  examine	  how	  a	  change	  in	  one	  scale	  of	  the	  system	  affects	  both	  itself	  and	  each	  of	  the	  other	  scales	  by	  using	  an	  impulse	  response	  function	  (IRF).	  We	  first	  set	  all	  of	  the	  predictor	  values	  and	  error	  terms	  to	  zero.	  We	  then	  perturb	  the	  system	  by	  adding	  one	  standard	  deviation	  to	  the	  error	  value	  of	  one,	  and	  only	  one,	  scale	  of	  the	  system.	  Finally,	  we	  track	  how	  this	  perturbation	  affects	  both	  the	  perturbed	  scale	  and	  all	  other	  scales	  over	  later	  time	  steps.	  	   Figure	  7	  shows	  the	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  on	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  scales.	  All	  of	  the	  predictors	  and	  error	  values	  were	  set	  to	  zero;	  we	  then	  added	  one	  standard	  deviation	  to	  the	  error	  value	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale,	  Q	  =	  4.	  The	  blue	  line	  represents	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  the	  magenta	  line	  represents	  the	  induction	  condition,	  and	  the	  pink	  bars	  are	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  Significance	  testing	  can	  be	  found	  within	  the	  plots	  themselves;	  if	  the	  error	  bars	  for	  a	  given	  line	  do	  not	  include	  zero,	  than	  that	  effect	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  a	  .05	  level.	  Similarly,	  when	  the	  two	  lines	  representing	  different	  conditions	  fall	  outside	  of	  each	  others	  
	   19	  
error	  bars,	  than	  changes	  in	  activity	  between	  the	  two	  conditions	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level.	  For	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  (Q=4)	  decreases	  system	  activity	  across	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  scales,	  represented	  by	  the	  significant	  deviation	  from	  baseline;	  this	  decrease	  is	  most	  obvious	  at	  the	  lower	  scales	  of	  Q.	  For	  the	  induction	  condition,	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  increases	  system	  activity	  at	  all	  scales,	  particularly	  the	  shorter	  scales.	  	   We	  next	  looked	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  perturbing	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale.	  Figure	  8	  shows	  this	  perturbation	  effect;	  in	  both	  conditions,	  the	  effect	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  scale.	  System	  activity	  decreases	  over	  time	  in	  all	  scales	  for	  those	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  while	  system	  activity	  increases	  over	  all	  scales	  for	  the	  induction	  condition.	   Discussion	  	   As	  predicted,	  multi-­‐scale	  effects	  between	  the	  two	  conditions	  differed	  greatly.	  In	  the	  first	  condition,	  participants	  were	  told	  explicitly	  how	  they	  were	  to	  sort	  the	  cards	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  run.	  In	  this	  condition,	  the	  perturbation	  of	  activity	  of	  both	  the	  longest	  and	  shortest	  time	  scales	  led	  to	  a	  general	  decrease	  in	  system	  activity	  across	  all	  time	  scales.	  In	  the	  second	  condition,	  participants	  were	  required	  to	  infer	  which	  rule	  to	  use	  in	  sorting	  the	  cards.	  In	  this	  condition,	  the	  perturbation	  of	  both	  the	  longest	  and	  shortest	  time	  scales	  led	  to	  a	  general	  increase	  in	  system	  activity	  across	  all	  other	  scales.	  Due	  to	  the	  increased	  difficulty	  of	  the	  task,	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  interaction	  amongst	  levels	  of	  the	  system	  is	  required	  to	  create	  the	  new	  cognitive	  structure	  necessary	  to	  complete	  the	  task.	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   In	  a	  physical	  system,	  gradients	  of	  energy	  of	  matter	  interact	  across	  multiple	  timescales;	  their	  interactions	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  structure	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  circumstance.	  The	  types	  of	  multi-­‐scale	  interactions	  will	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  information	  received.	  In	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  being	  explicitly	  told	  the	  rule	  led	  to	  the	  fast	  creation	  of	  the	  cognitive	  structure	  necessary	  to	  perform	  the	  task.	  Participants	  in	  this	  condition	  showed	  a	  general	  decrease	  in	  activity,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  significant	  decrease	  from	  baseline	  at	  each	  scale	  of	  Q,	  as	  the	  interactions	  across	  scales	  in	  the	  system	  settled	  around	  the	  newly	  created	  cognitive	  structure.	  	   In	  the	  induction	  condition,	  participants	  had	  to	  acquire	  the	  rule	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  run.	  Interestingly,	  we	  see	  that	  in	  this	  condition	  the	  unique	  effects	  of	  each	  scale	  across	  all	  scales	  of	  the	  system	  were	  greater	  than	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition.	  This	  suggests	  that	  fluctuations	  at	  all	  scales	  are	  involved	  in	  organizing	  to	  the	  new	  rule,	  as	  the	  participant	  worked	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  new	  rule.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  study	  bear	  out	  this	  prediction;	  system	  activity	  was	  much	  greater	  across	  all	  scales,	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  activity	  required	  to	  create	  the	  necessary	  structure	  was	  greater	  than	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition.	  In	  the	  induction	  condition,	  activity	  across	  all	  time	  scales	  interact	  to	  drive	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  structure;	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  the	  degree	  of	  system	  activity	  required	  to	  create	  new	  structure	  is	  much	  less.	  In	  both	  cases,	  though,	  changes	  in	  multi-­‐scale	  activity	  cause	  changes	  in	  diffusion	  patterns	  that	  can	  be	  measured.	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  contrast	  between	  these	  findings	  and	  the	  findings	  one	  would	  expect	  from	  the	  system	  under	  the	  standard	  conception	  of	  executive	  function.	  The	  mainstream	  view	  of	  executive	  function	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  a	  higher	  order,	  top-­‐down	  process	  that	  imposes	  order	  on	  the	  system	  (Carlson,	  2003).	  If	  this	  were	  the	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case,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  longest	  time	  scales	  would	  be	  the	  only	  ones	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  cognitive	  system,	  regardless	  of	  condition.	  One	  would	  predict	  that	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  would	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  all	  of	  the	  other	  scales,	  and	  that	  perturbing	  the	  shorter	  time	  scales	  would	  have	  no	  effect.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  however;	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  perturbing	  both	  the	  long	  and	  short	  time	  scales	  changes	  the	  level	  of	  activity	  of	  the	  system,	  suggesting	  that	  success	  on	  executive	  function	  tasks	  may	  rely	  on	  general	  cognitive	  flexibility,	  instead	  of	  the	  use	  of	  a	  higher-­‐order	  central	  planner.	  	  	   Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  study,	  we	  decided	  to	  explore	  multi-­‐scale	  effects	  in	  the	  card	  sorting	  of	  children.	  Because	  preschool-­‐aged	  children	  typically	  have	  much	  more	  difficulty	  with	  executive	  function	  tasks,	  preschool	  data	  should	  provide	  an	  interesting	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  data	  gathered	  on	  adult	  participants,	  who	  would	  normally	  be	  expected	  to	  easily	  complete	  these	  tasks.	  	  	   Recall	  that	  as	  children	  develop,	  their	  ability	  to	  complete	  executive	  function	  tasks,	  like	  card	  sorting,	  increases.	  Preschool-­‐aged	  children	  will,	  when	  asked	  to	  switch	  from	  one	  sorting	  rule	  to	  another,	  frequently	  persist	  in	  using	  the	  already	  acquired	  rule;	  this	  is	  typically	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  poorly	  developed	  executive	  functioning	  (Zelazo,	  2006).	  Therefore,	  our	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  examine	  differences	  in	  multi-­‐scale	  interactions	  between	  participants	  who	  could	  switch	  sorting	  rules	  mid-­‐run	  and	  those	  who	  were	  unable	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  continued	  to	  sort	  by	  the	  old	  rule	  when	  provided	  with	  a	  new	  one.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  the	  task	  from	  study	  one	  was	  modified	  to	  include	  a	  rule	  switch	  halfway	  through	  each	  run.	  We	  predict	  that	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participants	  who	  are	  able	  to	  switch	  rules	  successfully	  will	  have	  different	  multi-­‐scale	  effects	  from	  those	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  switch	  rules.	  Experiment	  2	  Method	  
Participants	  
	   Seventeen	  preschoolers	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  three	  and	  five	  participated.	  All	  participants	  gave	  both	  parental	  consent	  and	  child	  assent	  before	  participating.	  Participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  local	  preschools,	  along	  with	  the	  University	  of	  Connecticut	  child	  labs.	  Participants	  received	  no	  reward	  for	  participation.	  
Materials	  	   Participants	  sorted	  cards	  from	  the	  same	  type	  of	  deck	  as	  in	  experiment	  1.	  Also	  as	  in	  experiment	  1,	  each	  participant’s	  sorting-­‐hand	  motions	  were	  tracked	  for	  each	  run	  using	  a	  magnetic	  motion-­‐capture	  device.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  participant’s	  hand	  was	  sampled	  at	  60	  Hz.	  
Procedure	  
	   The	  experimental	  field	  was	  the	  same	  as	  in	  experiment	  1.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  draw	  cards	  from	  a	  face	  down	  deck	  and	  place	  them	  into	  piles,	  as	  in	  the	  first	  experiment.	  The	  same	  cards	  were	  used	  in	  the	  second	  experiments.	  As	  we	  were	  working	  with	  younger	  participants,	  however,	  only	  the	  color	  and	  animal	  dimensions	  were	  used	  as	  guide	  rules;	  the	  clothing	  item	  dimension	  was	  never	  chosen	  as	  the	  sorting	  rule.	  Importantly,	  unlike	  experiment	  1,	  in	  the	  second	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  never	  told	  which	  rule	  to	  use.	  In	  the	  second	  experiment,	  each	  participant	  was	  required	  to	  induce	  the	  rule	  using	  experimenter	  feedback.	  
	   23	  
Participants	  were	  required	  to	  sort	  thirty	  cards	  per	  run,	  regardless	  of	  the	  level	  of	  success	  he	  or	  she	  had.	  Participants	  received	  experimenter	  feedback	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  each	  card	  was	  being	  placed	  correctly.	  	   The	  key	  manipulation	  in	  the	  second	  experiment	  is	  the	  change	  in	  rules	  during	  the	  run.	  In	  this	  experiment,	  the	  rule	  was	  changed	  after	  fifteen	  cards	  had	  been	  placed,	  i.e.	  at	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  run.	  As	  with	  the	  initial	  rule,	  the	  participant	  was	  not	  informed	  that	  the	  rule	  had	  changed,	  and	  was	  required	  to	  induce	  that	  a	  change	  had	  occurred	  through	  feedback.	  The	  rule	  was	  switched	  either	  from	  color	  to	  animal,	  or	  the	  opposite.	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  examine	  perseveration,	  by	  comparing	  participants	  who	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  switch	  to	  the	  new	  rule	  with	  participants	  who	  continued	  to	  sort	  by	  the	  old	  rule.	  	   Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  up	  to	  five	  runs	  during	  an	  experimental	  period.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  working	  with	  children,	  many	  participants	  chose	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  task	  after	  fewer	  than	  five	  runs;	  as	  a	  result,	  participants	  completed	  an	  average	  of	  three	  runs	  each.	  Because	  we	  were	  most	  interested	  in	  studying	  the	  effect	  of	  perseveration,	  only	  complete	  runs,	  where	  a	  participant	  was	  able	  to	  place	  all	  thirty	  cards,	  were	  submitted	  for	  analysis.	  
Analysis	  	   Participant	  time	  series	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  parts	  before	  analysis,	  which	  corresponded	  to	  estimates	  of	  the	  point	  in	  the	  run	  at	  which	  the	  rule	  was	  changed.	  Instead	  of	  examining	  the	  time	  series	  as	  a	  whole,	  analysis	  was	  instead	  done	  on	  the	  two	  parts.	  	  As	  in	  the	  first	  experiment,	  the	  time	  series	  of	  hand	  motions	  of	  each	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participant	  was	  subjected	  to	  Multifractal	  DFA.	  MF-­‐DFA	  estimates	  were	  then	  used	  in	  a	  Vector	  Autoregression	  Analysis.	   Results	  Each	  participant’s	  runs	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  parts,	  based	  on	  when	  the	  rule	  switch	  occurred.	  Prior	  to	  the	  switch,	  participants	  sorted	  an	  average	  of	  12.04	  cards	  correctly	  out	  of	  15	  total	  placements	  (SD	  =	  3.88).	  After	  the	  switch,	  participants	  sorted	  an	  average	  of	  8.5	  cards	  correctly	  out	  of	  15	  (SD	  =	  4.21).	  Participants	  took	  roughly	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  place	  fifteen	  cards	  both	  before	  (M	  =	  133.5	  seconds,	  SD	  =	  51.85)	  and	  after	  (M	  =	  135.2,	  SD	  =	  48.9)	  the	  rule	  switch.	  	  	   The	  comparison	  of	  interest	  is	  between	  perseveration	  and	  non-­‐perseveration	  runs.	  A	  perseveration	  run	  is	  one	  in	  which	  a	  child	  persists	  in	  using	  the	  initial	  rule,	  after	  a	  rule	  switch	  occurs	  and	  feedback	  from	  the	  experimenter	  indicates	  that	  the	  old	  rule	  is	  no	  longer	  correct.	  A	  non-­‐perseveration	  run	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  is	  able	  to	  successfully	  switch	  rules	  at	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  trial	  	   For	  these	  analyses,	  we	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  data	  gathered	  after	  the	  rule	  switch,	  as	  the	  inability	  to	  change	  rules	  after	  the	  switch	  is	  indicative	  of	  perseveration.	  Each	  post-­‐switch	  run	  was	  placed	  into	  one	  of	  two	  groups	  for	  analysis,	  based	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  perseveration	  had	  occurred.	  Perseveration	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  successful	  placement	  of	  at	  least	  60%	  of	  the	  cards	  prior	  to	  the	  rule	  switch,	  followed	  by	  the	  successful	  placement	  of	  less	  than	  60%	  of	  the	  cards	  after	  the	  switch.	  Non-­‐perseveration	  runs	  were	  defined	  as	  the	  successful	  placement	  of	  60%	  of	  the	  cards	  prior	  to	  the	  rule	  switch,	  while	  successfully	  sorting	  60%	  or	  more	  of	  the	  cards	  after	  the	  rule	  switch.	  Under	  these	  criteria,	  there	  were	  22	  perseveration	  runs	  and	  16	  non-­‐
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perseveration	  runs.	  Runs	  in	  which	  a	  participant	  failed	  to	  acquire	  the	  initial	  rule,	  defined	  as	  less	  than	  60%	  successful	  placement	  prior	  to	  the	  rule	  switch,	  were	  not	  used	  in	  these	  analyses;	  only	  two	  runs	  excluded	  under	  this	  criteria.	  	   As	  in	  the	  first	  experiment,	  we	  created	  a	  time	  series	  of	  displacements	  for	  each	  run	  by	  calculating	  Euclidean	  distances	  between	  each	  sample	  in	  each	  motion	  time	  series.	  	  Figure	  9	  shows	  a	  sample	  time	  series	  in	  the	  upper	  panel	  and	  its	  accompanying	  displacement	  series	  in	  the	  lower	  panel.	  	   We	  applied	  MF-­‐DFA	  to	  each	  of	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  switch	  time	  series;	  because	  we	  were	  interested	  primarily	  in	  perseveration,	  we	  focused	  analyses	  on	  post	  switch	  data.	  We	  have	  performed	  preliminary	  analyses	  on	  data	  collected	  prior	  to	  the	  rule	  switch,	  but	  more	  thorough	  analysis	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  manuscript.	  As	  in	  the	  first	  experiment,	  we	  transformed	  each	  series	  by	  a	  factor	  Q	  ranging	  from	  -­‐4	  to	  4	  in	  .5	  increments.	  Figure	  10	  shows	  the	  mean	  scaling	  exponent	  for	  each	  time	  scale,	  with	  both	  pre	  and	  post	  switch	  means	  represented.	  Figure	  11	  shows	  the	  mean	  R2	  value	  of	  the	  linear	  fit	  between	  RMSE	  and	  bin	  size	  for	  each	  time	  scale,	  with	  both	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  switch	  means	  represented	  here	  as	  well.	  As	  in	  the	  first	  experiment,	  the	  fits	  across	  each	  scale	  of	  Q	  were	  generally	  strong.	  	   As	  in	  the	  first	  study,	  MF-­‐DFA	  estimates	  were	  used	  in	  VAR	  analysis.	  Runs	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  groups	  based	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  participant	  perseverated	  in	  that	  run.	  We	  looked	  at	  system	  activity	  effects	  based	  on	  the	  perseveration/non-­‐perseveration	  dichotomy.	  	  	   We	  first	  examined	  the	  non-­‐perseveration	  runs	  –	  runs	  where	  participants	  sorted	  the	  majority	  of	  cards	  correctly	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  rule	  switch.	  Figure	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12	  shows	  the	  unique	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  on	  both	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  time	  scales.	  The	  blue	  line	  represents	  pre-­‐switch	  runs,	  while	  the	  magenta	  line	  represents	  post-­‐switch	  runs;	  the	  pink	  lines	  are	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  As	  in	  the	  first	  experiment,	  differences	  between	  lines	  that	  exceed	  the	  lengths	  of	  the	  error	  bars	  are	  significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level.	  In	  both	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  switch	  runs,	  the	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  itself	  or	  on	  any	  of	  the	  other	  scales	  of	  activity;	  after	  the	  initial	  perturbation,	  reflected	  in	  the	  slight	  bump	  immediately	  following	  the	  first	  time	  step,	  system	  activity	  across	  all	  scales	  soon	  returned	  to	  baseline.	  	   Figure	  13	  shows	  the	  unique	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  on	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  scales.	  	  The	  three	  lines	  are	  the	  same	  as	  above.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐switch	  case,	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  led	  to	  small	  effects	  across	  itself	  and	  other	  scales.	  In	  the	  few	  cases	  where	  there	  was	  an	  effect	  on	  system	  activity,	  that	  effect	  was	  negative.	  However,	  in	  the	  post-­‐switch	  runs,	  the	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  scale	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  noticeably	  increasing	  system	  activity	  at	  the	  mid	  to	  long	  scales,	  while	  slightly	  decreasing	  activity	  at	  shorter	  scales.	  	   Next,	  we	  looked	  at	  system	  activity	  in	  the	  perseveration	  runs.	  	  Figure	  14	  shows	  the	  unique	  effect	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  on	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  scales.	  In	  both	  the	  pre	  (blue	  line)	  and	  post	  (magenta	  line)	  switch	  runs,	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  activity	  at	  the	  mid	  to	  long	  scales;	  however,	  in	  both	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  switch	  runs,	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  had	  a	  strong	  negative	  effect	  on	  activity	  at	  the	  shortest	  time	  scales,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  decrease	  in	  system	  activity	  for	  negative	  values	  of	  Q.	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   Finally,	  we	  examined	  the	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  on	  all	  other	  time	  scales	  during	  perseveration	  runs.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐switch	  runs,	  perturbing	  the	  shortest	  scale	  had	  a	  strong	  negative	  effect	  on	  system	  activity	  on	  itself	  and	  all	  other	  time	  scales.	  In	  post-­‐switch	  runs,	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  scales	  had	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  shortest	  scales,	  and	  a	  very	  small	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  longest	  time	  scales.	  These	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  15.	  Discussion	  	   Multi-­‐scale	  activity	  of	  the	  perseveration	  and	  non-­‐perseveration	  runs	  differed	  greatly.	  Recall	  that	  a	  run	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  placement	  of	  thirty	  consecutive	  cards.	  In	  the	  non-­‐perseveration	  runs,	  where	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  switch	  rules	  successfully,	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  had	  no	  effect	  during	  post-­‐rule-­‐switch	  sorting,	  while	  perturbing	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  system	  activity.	  At	  the	  shortest	  time	  scales,	  perseveraters	  had	  similar	  effects	  –	  perturbation	  caused	  a	  general	  increase	  in	  activity	  across	  all	  scales.	  At	  the	  longest	  time	  scale,	  however,	  post-­‐switch	  perseveration	  runs	  had	  a	  much	  different	  effect,	  where	  perturbation	  led	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  activity,	  instead	  of	  having	  no	  effect.	  	   These	  results	  suggest	  that	  switching	  rules	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  run	  creates	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  shortest	  time	  scales	  on	  all	  other	  scales	  in	  the	  system.	  In	  experiment	  1,	  participants	  in	  the	  induction	  condition,	  whose	  task	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  task	  performed	  by	  the	  preschoolers,	  showed	  results	  similar	  to	  those	  found	  here.	  Like	  the	  non-­‐perseveraters	  in	  experiment	  2,	  perturbing	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  had	  the	  greatest	  effect	  on	  all	  other	  time	  scales.	  The	  longest	  time	  scale	  effects	  are	  even	  more	  interesting,	  where	  perseveraters	  and	  non-­‐perseveraters	  differ	  greatly.	  For	  non-­‐
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perseveraters,	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale;	  system	  activity	  at	  the	  other	  scales	  quickly	  returns	  to	  baseline.	  For	  perseveraters,	  however,	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  system	  activity.	  In	  terms	  of	  multi-­‐scale	  interactions,	  the	  prime	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  is	  here.	  	   Recall	  again	  that	  the	  standard	  method	  of	  describing	  executive	  function	  is	  as	  a	  higher	  order,	  top	  down	  process.	  As	  in	  the	  first	  study,	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  activity	  at	  the	  longest	  time	  scales	  would	  have	  the	  greatest	  effect	  on	  success	  in	  an	  executive	  function	  task.	  We	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  of	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  scale	  in	  non-­‐perseveraters,	  and	  a	  neutral	  effect	  of	  perturbing	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  in	  perseveraters,	  which	  matches	  a	  deficiency	  in	  executive	  function	  that	  prevents	  the	  perseveraters	  from	  changing	  rules.	  	   The	  results	  of	  the	  current	  study	  contradict	  these	  expectations,	  however.	  The	  participants	  with	  presumably	  the	  most	  highly	  developed	  executive	  function,	  who	  are	  able	  to	  switch	  rules	  midway	  through	  each	  run,	  show	  no	  special	  effect	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale.	  The	  participants	  with	  the	  least	  developed	  executive	  function,	  those	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  switch,	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  of	  longer	  time	  scales.	  This	  suggests	  that	  higher	  order	  capabilities,	  instead	  of	  being	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  executive	  function,	  may	  actively	  hinder	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  cognitive	  structure.	  	   Central	  to	  developmental	  psychology	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  current	  results	  suggest	  that	  rather	  than	  being	  accomplished	  through	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  central	  executive,	  cognitive	  control	  is	  derived	  from	  interactions	  amongst	  physical	  gradients	  of	  the	  system.	  These	  interactions	  create	  new	  cognitive	  structure,	  allowing	  the	  system	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  its	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circumstances.	  	  Higher	  order	  processes,	  rather	  than	  driving	  change,	  can	  actively	  inhibit	  the	  system	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  cognitive	  structure.	  
Future	  Directions	  	   The	  current	  studies	  have	  established	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  work	  in	  this	  area.	  This	  study	  has	  shown	  that	  cognitive	  structures	  may	  be	  derived	  from	  physical	  interactions	  within	  the	  system.	  In	  order	  to	  further	  investigate	  this	  paradigm,	  there	  are	  three	  primary	  avenues	  of	  research	  that	  are	  worth	  pursuing.	  	   First,	  further	  examination	  of	  executive	  function	  tasks	  would	  help	  to	  extend	  the	  work	  presented	  in	  this	  manuscript,	  particularly	  in	  children.	  Prior	  research	  has	  shown,	  at	  least	  in	  other	  domains,	  that	  children	  can	  be	  made	  to	  succeed	  at	  tasks	  that	  were	  previously	  thought	  impossible	  based	  on	  their	  progression	  through	  developmental	  milestones,	  by	  manipulating	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  task	  (Smith	  et	  al,	  1999).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  manipulating	  the	  constraints	  of	  card	  sorting	  and	  other	  executive	  function	  tasks	  could	  alter	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  physical	  interactions	  within	  the	  system	  change,	  allowing	  the	  children	  to	  succeed	  at	  the	  task.	  	   Because	  cognitive	  control	  is	  so	  integral	  to	  every	  day	  functioning,	  examining	  it	  further	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  future	  direction	  to	  explore.	  It	  would	  be	  wise,	  however,	  to	  extend	  this	  research	  paradigm	  into	  other	  areas	  of	  cognitive	  development.	  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  cognition	  is	  its	  potential	  to	  replace	  the	  convoluted	  picture	  of	  cognition	  that	  we	  have	  now	  with	  one	  unifying	  method	  of	  explanation.	  Instead	  of	  having	  different	  theories	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  different	  cognitive	  capabilities	  (executive	  function,	  memory,	  attention,	  etc.),	  all	  of	  cognition	  could	  be	  explained	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  physical	  interactions.	  For	  this	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reason,	  the	  second	  avenue	  of	  research	  would	  be	  to	  extend	  this	  work	  into	  other	  areas	  of	  cognition.	  The	  flexible	  nature	  of	  our	  measurement	  tools	  means	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  adapt	  them	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  study	  within	  psychology.	  We	  would	  expect	  that	  other	  psychological	  systems	  would	  show	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  patterns	  as	  we’ve	  seen	  in	  executive	  function,	  lending	  strength	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  same	  physical	  processes	  underlie	  all	  of	  cognition.	  	   Finally,	  it	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  explore	  the	  measurement	  of	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  body,	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	  that	  the	  diffusion	  patterns	  that	  we	  see	  when	  measuring	  hand	  motions	  are	  accurately	  measuring	  the	  underlying	  processes.	  We	  have	  the	  tools	  to	  examine	  diffusion	  patterns	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  body,	  such	  as	  eye	  movements	  and	  postural	  sway,	  during	  a	  variety	  of	  tasks.	  We	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  patterns	  found	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  body	  would	  match	  those	  found	  when	  tracking	  the	  motions	  of	  the	  hand;	  confirming	  that	  multiple	  areas	  of	  the	  body	  react	  in	  the	  same	  way	  during	  tasks	  would	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  the	  processes	  outlined	  in	  this	  manuscript	  exist,	  and	  that	  they	  exist	  independently	  of	  any	  one	  area	  of	  the	  body.	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Figures	  Figure	  1:	  	  Rendition	  of	  the	  Small	  Magellanic	  Cloud	  at	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  magnification,	  taken	  using	  the	  Spitzer	  telescope.	  The	  leftmost	  photo	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  cloud	  itself.	  The	  central	  picture	  is	  a	  magnification	  of	  the	  cloud,	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  partially	  made	  up	  of	  planetary	  nebulae.	  The	  rightmost	  is	  a	  magnification	  of	  the	  nebulae,	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  made	  up	  of	  carbon	  molecules.	  The	  smallest	  scale	  is	  nested	  within	  the	  central	  scale,	  which	  is	  nested	  within	  the	  largest;	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  cloud	  itself	  is	  a	  product	  of	  structure	  at	  finer	  scales	  of	  measurement.	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Figure	  2:	  An	  example	  of	  the	  card-­‐sorting	  task.	  Participants	  were	  presented	  with	  four	  guide	  cards.	  The	  guide	  cards	  each	  have	  a	  unique	  value	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  dimensions	  (animal,	  color,	  and	  clothing	  item).	  Participants	  were	  required	  to	  draw	  a	  card	  and	  place	  it	  into	  the	  correct	  guide	  pile,	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  rule	  for	  that	  run.	  In	  the	  example	  below,	  the	  blue	  cow	  with	  glasses	  would	  be	  placed	  into	  the	  second	  pile	  if	  the	  rule	  was	  “color”,	  the	  third	  pile	  if	  the	  rule	  was	  “clothing	  item”,	  or	  the	  fourth	  pile	  if	  the	  rule	  was	  “animal”.	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Figure	  3:	  Sample	  interpoint	  distance	  time	  series.	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Figure	  4.	  Sample	  range	  of	  scaling	  exponents	  over	  multiple	  epochs,	  for	  one	  run	  (22nd	  participant,	  first	  run).	  Each	  line	  represents	  a	  series	  of	  scaling	  exponents	  for	  a	  different	  level	  of	  Q.	  










	   39	  
Figure	  5.	  Mean	  scaling	  exponent	  across	  a	  range	  of	  Q	  values.	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Figure	  6.	  Mean	  R	  squared	  values	  for	  the	  fit	  between	  root	  mean	  square	  error	  and	  bin	  size,	  across	  a	  range	  of	  Q	  values.	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Figure	  7:	  The	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  on	  all	  other	  scales.	  The	  blue	  line	  represents	  participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  and	  the	  magenta	  line	  represents	  the	  induction	  condition.	  The	  pink	  errors	  bars	  are	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  Participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition	  show	  a	  decrease	  in	  system	  activity	  at	  all	  scales;	  participants	  in	  the	  induction	  condition	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  system	  activity.	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Figure	  8:	  The	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  shortest	  time	  scale	  on	  all	  other	  scales.	  The	  blue	  line	  represents	  participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  and	  the	  magenta	  line	  represents	  the	  induction	  condition.	  The	  pink	  errors	  bars	  are	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  Participants	  in	  the	  explicit	  condition	  show	  a	  decrease	  in	  system	  activity	  at	  all	  scales;	  participants	  in	  the	  induction	  condition	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  system	  activity.	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Figure	  9:	  Sample	  interpoint	  distance	  time	  series,	  pre-­‐school	  data.	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Figure	  10.	  Mean	  scaling	  exponent	  across	  a	  range	  of	  Q	  values	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  sorts,	  pre-­‐school	  data.	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Figure	  11.	  Mean	  R	  squared	  values	  for	  the	  fit	  between	  root	  mean	  square	  error	  and	  bin	  size,	  across	  a	  range	  of	  Q	  values,	  pre-­‐school	  data.	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Figure	  12:	  The	  effect	  of	  perturbation	  of	  the	  longest	  time	  scale	  on	  all	  other	  scales,	  for	  non-­‐perseveraters.	  The	  blue	  line	  represents	  the	  pre-­‐switch	  runs,	  and	  the	  magenta	  line	  represents	  post-­‐switch	  runs.	  The	  pink	  errors	  bars	  are	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  For	  both	  pre	  and	  post	  switch,	  perturbation	  of	  this	  scale	  leads	  to	  a	  null	  effect.	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Tables	  Table	  1:	  Model	  coefficients	  for	  model	  1,	  predicting	  to	  length	  of	  run.	  An	  *	  indicates	  that	  the	  predictor	  in	  question	  is	  significant.	  Predictor	   Estimate	   SE	   z	  Intercept	   27.748	   .927	   29.91*	  Run	   -­‐1.91	   .085	   -­‐22.43*	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Table	  2:	  Model	  coefficients	  for	  model	  1,	  predicting	  to	  length	  of	  run.	  An	  *	  indicates	  that	  the	  predictor	  in	  question	  is	  significant.	  Predictor	   Estimate	   SE	   z	  Intercept	   22.109	   1.06	   23.557*	  Run	   -­‐1.911	   .085	   -­‐22.425*	  Group	  (0	  =	  explicit,	  1	  =	  induction)	   5.279	   1.462	   3.604*	  	  
